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ABSTRACT 
The Advanced Packet Obfuscation and Control program (Apoc) was developed to 
extend the functionality of the ISEAGE lab. The Internet Scale Event and Attack 
Generation Environment (ISEAGE) lab implements a virtual Internet testbed where 
cyber attacks can be tested. Apoc is a. very dynamic tool which can be configured to 
irnplerrlerlt a number of rriodificatiorls to packets as they traverse the network. These 
modifications primarily focus on increasing the flow of traf~iic through ISEAGE and 
abstracting the source of attacks. Apoc works by interpreting a user provided script 
uThich specifies the modifications to be performed. Although Apoc «~a.s inspired primarily 
for use irl the ISEAGE lab, it is also a useful tool for snarly real world problems. 
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
The development of strong security testing tools is necessary to provide adminis-
trators with the ability to ensure security in their systems. Recent reports by the 
Government Accountability Office from fiscal year 2005 report that the "testing of se-
curity controls" is a~ major problem in information security (1) . The Advanced Packet 
Obfuscation arld Control program (Apoc) is a tool that will provide a riurriber of use-
ful features for security testing purposes. The main focus in the development of Apoc 
was the implementation of a frame«cork which provides the ability to perform arbitrary 
modifications to network traffic. 
There are a dumber of tools currently available which focus on the modification of 
netv~~ork traffic. The end goal of these modifications can vary greatly from changing 
network topology to performing malicious acts. An example of a more benign modifica-
tion is network address translation (NAT) , `which is used to allow any number of hosts 
oll an internal network to share one unique external address. On the other e11d of this 
spectrum are tools that provide a means to create Man in the Middle (Mitts) attack. A 
Mitts attack performs some malicious act based on the attacker's ability to modify the 
traffic bet«peen two hosts. 
Apoc provides a framework to accomplish a range of the goals attained by the pre-
viously mentioned tools. Apoc is a separate host that is placed in the network bet«~een 
communicating hosts. Therefore, all traffic between these hosts is routed through Apoc 
providing it complete control over this traffic. This framework attempts to deduce all 
desirable functionality out of its ability to control this traffic. In this scope Apoc is 
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focused on providing functions ranging from helping with zletwork corifiguratiorl and 
communication to providing a means to launch malicious attacks. 
Apoc's ability to be a central mediator of all packets on a net`~,~ork creates some 
similarities to a. NAT or firewall. The functionality of Apoc differs greatly from both 
of these as it is not aimed at increasing the security of a network. NATs a.rld fire«~a11s 
typically utilize their centralized location to limit the passing of any unwanted traffic. 
Apoc's uses are generally coupled with testing exercises and are not intended to be used 
for typical network operations. This introduces some significant differences betv~Teen 
these tools. 
First Apoc is focused on performing many arbitrary modifications to packets. While 
a N' AT may have to perform general modifications to IP addresses and ports, Apoc must 
be able to perform very fine grain modifications. This includes changing the value of 
any specific fields in a packet and introducing an element of randomness to the traffic. 
Secondly, as Apoc is not a typical network gateway it has significantly different 
requirements from a NAT or firewall. Typically a NAT or firewall will focus on filtering 
out any data that may be malicious. Since most of the traffic passed through Apoc is 
done so for security testing purposes, it must be able to accurately forward all malicious 
traffic. This requires that Apoc handle traffic slightly differently than a NAT or fire`~Tall. 
Thirdly, Apoc is not an addressable machine. A packet will never be addressed 
to Apoc, as it only modifies packets destined to other hosts. Apoc's presence on the 
network will be completely unnoticeable by any host on that network. Apoc also does 
not decrement the IP Time to Live field as a NAT or firewall «could. 
Apoc's design was inspired to meet the specific needs of the Internet Scale Event 
and Attack Generation Environment (ISEAGE) lab. ISEAGE is an extremely scalable 
netv~Tork testbed developed here at Iowa State University. The primary goal of ISEAGE 
is to recreate a realistic model of the Internet in a confined lab environment. Apoc 
provides a method to perform ~, nl~mber of modifications to ISEAGE's network traffic 
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~~~itli arl erid goal of creating a more realistic Irlterrlet erlvirorlrrlerlt. Apoc assists ISEAGE 
in number of ways, mostly focusing on creating traffic that appears more realistic and 
providing a more abstract means to launch attacks. The use of Apoc extends beyond 
the scope of ISEAGE as many of its functions have practical uses in other situations. 
Chapter 2, titled Background, will provide arl overview of many technologies relevant 
to Apoc. Chapter 3, titled Practical Uses of Apoc; will explain how Apoc can be used. 
Chapter 4, titled Design and Implementation, will describe the inner workings of Apoc. 
Chapter 5, titled Results, will explain ho~v Apoc has meet it's initial goals. Chapter 
~, titled Sururnary, will conclude the work performed on this project. Chapter 7, titled 
Future V~Tork, tivill explain what should be accomplished if `work on Apoc continues. 
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CHAPTER 2 Background 
The development of Apoc is based upon a number of current technologies. This 
section focuses on introducing these technologies and describing their relevance to Apoc. 
It starts by explaining basic net«pork concepts. Next it explains the ISEAGE project 
which inspired its crca~tion. Finally it introduces two tools, Ettercap and Netfilter; which 
have lead a strong influence orl the developrrierlt of Apoc. 
Internet Basics 
A thorough understanding of Apoc will require a solid background in computer net- 
vc~orking. This section will attempt to provide a brief revie«T of the current networking 
protocols arld ideologies that Apoc's functionality is based upon. 
The most popular model used in describing computer networks is the Open Systems 
Interconnections (OSI) model. The OSI model consists of seven different layers. Each 
layer describes a set of requirement necessary to implement a network communication 
between two hosts. Although the OSI model is the most popular rlet~~~ork model, it was 
developed after initial Internet research was performed. This tends to cause discrepancies 
between the OSI model and Internet, however, the OSI model will still be used in this 
review. In this section each layer of the OSI model will be explained along with any 
relevant protocols. 
An example of the OSI model and how it is used to create and transmit packets 
is shown in Figure 2.1. This figure shows how a packet is created as each layer adds 
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its protocol headers to the front of the data received from tl~e upper layer. First the 
application level data is added, then the transport layer protocol header is added to the 
front. The network and data link layer protocol headers are then added accordingly. 
Finally, all of the data is transmitted at the net`vork interface by the physical layer. 
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Figure 2.1 The OSI model and packet construction 
Physical Layer 
This layer deals with the physical tra,rlsrrlission of bits over a. network. It deals mostly 
the the transmission of electronic signals over some physical medium «Thether it be a ~.~rire 
or radio «~aves. This layer is particularly concerned with things like transmission rates, 
voltage levels, and bit encoding. The workings of the physical layer arc not particularly 
important in the development of Apoc. 
Data Link Layer 
The data link layer provides a means for implementing reliable data transmission 
across the physical network. This entails the creation of streams of bits which can be 
grouped together and sent to another host. These streams are typically referred to as 
frames. Data link protocols must provide some addressing mechanism to ensure that 
each frame arrives at the desired host. These frames should also support some sort of 
error checking in case a frame becomes damaged during transmission. The Data Link 
layer is typically split into two separate layers, the Logical Link Control (LLC) layer 
and the Media Access Control (1VIAC) layer. The MAC layer sits directly on top of the 
physical layer and is responsible for developing the frames and working with other host 
on the network to contend for the shared physical media. The LLC layer `works directly 
with the flow control and error control aspects of the data link layer. 
Ethernet 
The only data link protocol sl~pported in Apoc is Ethernet. Ethernet is ~, very 
popular wire based protocol for local area networks. Each host on an Ethernet network 
has an unique MAC address. Since every MAC address is unique; each host on the 
local network can be accessed through its address. A MAC address is 48 bits long and is 
commonly expressed the following notation 01:~~:.15:67:89:Oa,. E~~ch frame on ~, Ethernet 
network contains a destination 1V1AC address, a source MAC address, a 16 bit type field, 
and some data. Typically an Ethernet interface only reads a frame if the destination 
MAC address of the frame matches its own MAC address. However, Ethernet interfaces 
can be placed into `what is called prom,~;sc~~,o~~,~~ mode v~~here it reads every frame. A MAC 
address of f~':f~':fI':fI':f~':f~' is considered a broadcast address which means every host that 
receives this frame reads it. Figure 2.2 shows the structure of an Ethernet frame. 
a ~ 1~ ~~ 
C~~~int~tian 
.~d~r~~~ 
~a~rc~ 
~.ddress 
T~~p ~ ~~t~ 
Figure 2.2 An Ethernet packet 
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Network Layer 
The data link layer is limited to the trallsmissiorl of frames ozl a single network. 
The netvc~ork layer provides a means to deliver packets across multiple networks. This 
introduces two features, logical addresses and routing(2) . Net`vork layer addresses must 
be logical, that is, they should be allocated in a structure where the address provides 
information on the location of this host. Routing introduces the theory in which a 
packet travels throughout the Internet based solely on its logical address. The most 
popular protocols on the network layer are the Internet Protocol (IP) versions 4 and 
6, the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), and the Internet Control Message Protocol 
(ICMP) . The following sections elaborate on these common network layer protocols. 
IP 
The IP protocol provides the basic foundation for the Internet. Currently their are 
two versions of the IP protocol. version 4 (IPv4) is the version that the current Internet 
is based upon. IPv4 was developed years ago and is starting to show it,s age. Version 
6 (IPv6) was created as the successor to IPv4. V~Tllile there is a significant push to 
transition to IPv6. it is a slow and difficult task. 
In IPv4 each host has a unique 32 bit address expressed in the following format 
19,2.168.0.111. Figure 2.3 shows an IPv4 header. Each IP packet has a field for both 
tl~e source and destination address. Another field of interest is tl~e Tirrie to Live (TTL) . 
This specifies the number of times this packet can be routed. Each time this packet is 
forwarded this field is decremented. Once the field is zero the packet will not be further 
routed. 
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Figure 2.3 An IPv4 header 
ICMP 
The ICMP protocol was created to be used along with IP to perform many error 
reporting tasks. ICMP messages can be used to carry either error reporting or query 
r~lessages. Arl IP header is preperlded to arl ICMP packet izl order to provide the neces-
sary addressing capabilities. Although the ICMP data sits inside an IP header, ICMP is 
still considered a network layer protocol as it is an extension to IP and does not perform 
any upper layer tasks. The most common ICMP packets are the Echo Request/Replay 
messages. These are typically used to test if a host is running. An Echo Request query 
is sent to a host, if that host is functioning properly it responds with an Echo Reply 
message. 
ARP 
Although ARP sits on the network layer it is not an inter-network protocol like IP. 
ARP is used to obtain an unknoti~Tn MAC address with a known IP address. V~~henever 
a host sends a frame it must know the MAC address of the host intended to receive 
that frame, ho~~Tever, often times a host will only have the IP address for the destination 
host. AR.P works by sending a request packet to the broadcast MAC address, this AR.P 
Request packet contains the known IP address. Each host that receives this will check 
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to see if its IP rr~atcl~es the ore found in the ARP Request packet. If a rnatcll is found, 
that host will send an ARP Reply packet to the host that sent the Request. The ARP 
Reply packet contains the MAC address that matches the questioned IP address. Most 
operating systems keep a small dynamic cache table which maps IP address to their 
krlo«~rl MAC addresses. This prevents a host from having to perform an ARP Request 
every time a, frame is sent. Figure 2.4 shows the format of an ARP packet. 
1 
H~rd~,~r~ T,~P~ 
.. 
Protocol Heider 
Hard~~vare ~ 
Length 
_ 
Pr~tacol 
- T~Pe 
~iperati~n 
-- -
~ource P~A~ Address ~6 a}~tes~ 
©urce IP Address 
C~estinatit~n P~~r~~ Address f ~ h~,-ties j 
C~estinetion IP Address 
Figure 2.4 ARP packet 
Transport Layer 
Due to the functionality of the network layer all hosts on the Internet are able to 
cornlnunicate with each other. However, once a packet is received there needs to be 
a method to map that packet to the application which will process it. The transport 
layer addresses this problem by implementing port numbers. A port number is a 16 bit 
number which is used to map an application running on a host to the packets it sends 
and receives. Each application has its own unique port so their are no discrepancies 
between packets and their intended applications. For example, port 80 is reserved for 
v~Teb servers so all packets sent to port SO ti~lill be processed by the web server on that 
host. The two transport layer protocols are the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
and the Lser Datagram Protocol (UDP), these are explained below. 
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UDP 
UDP is a very simple protocol consisting only of the source and destination port 
numbers, the packet length, and a checksum. It provides no means to ensure accurate 
delivery of the packet. Typically UDP is only used when occasional packet loss is 
acceptable. Figure 2.5 shows an UDP header. 
~~ ~2 
Se~r~e Fort Destin~atian Part 
Total Length Gheekst~m 
Figure 2.5 UDP header 
TCP 
TCP is a reliable transport layer protocol, it provides mechanisms to assure that 
all data is properly received. TCP is an incredibly detailed protocol and will only bP 
briefly covered in this document. Reliability is provided by establishing a connection 
between communicating hosts. After this connection is established, packet delivery is 
ensured through Acknotivledgment packets. When a host receives a packet it sends 
an Ackno`vledgment packet, or Ack; back to the sender notifying that the packet was 
received. Through this method a host will know if' its packet «Tas successfully received. 
A host can continually reseed a packet until an Ack is received. Figure 2.6 shows the 
TCP header format. 
Session, Presentation, and Application Layer 
The highest three layers in the OSI model are the Session, Presentation, and Appli-
cation layers. These layers represent an area where the OSI model does accurately model 
common Internet traffic. Most current Internet colnlnunications only use the application 
layer, ignoring both the Session and Presentation layer. 
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Figure 2.6 TCP header 
The session layer was created to perform any necessary management functions be-
tween communicating hosts. The Presentation layer performs various data coding strate-
gies such as compression or encryption. It is used to make sure that each host can 
understand the data formats used by other hosts. The application layer is the layer 
that is directly accessed by the end user applications. All common Internet based ap-
plications such as email, web, or FTP have their own application layer protocol. This 
is typically encapsulated in either a TCP or LDP packet depending on the application 
layer protocol. 
ISEAGE 
The Internet Scale Event and Attack Generation Environment (ISEAGE) was de-
veloped at Io«la. State University by Dr. Doug Jacobson. ISEAGE creates a virtual 
Internet environment designed for "researching, designing, and testing cyber defense 
mechanisms" (3) . ISEAGE strives to create an environment that accurately portrays all 
characteristics of the authentic Internet. This allows researchers to test security solutions 
in a controlled environment while still maintaining the key attribl~tes of the Internet. 
The benefits of ISEAGE extend well beyond academic research. ISEAGE has already 
shown that it is a valuable asset in the education of both students and professionals as 
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it leas already been the host location for computer security carrlps, training sessions, and 
three Cyber Defense Competitions. 
ISEAGE has established a, set of domains where it will aid in solving many current 
information security problems (3) . These domains are described below. 
• Critical Infrastructure -ISEAGE can be used to recreate critical sections of the 
infrastructure which can be tested for security and survivability without tl~e threat 
of damaging the actual infrastructure. 
• End User Security -ISEAGE provides an ideal environment to train users on 
security related issues and new technologies. 
• Academic and Industrial Research -Researchers are provided with an environment 
t0 tP,St nP,W 1dP,aS and deVlces. 
• Forensics and Law Enforcement Agencies -ISEAGE can be used to experiment 
`~~ith tools attackers use and find novel ways to trace attacks. 
How ISEAGE Works 
ISEAGE's core consists of a group of gigabit switches. Corlrlected to these switches 
is a 64 node rack. Each node on this rack runs an instance of a virtual subnet. A virtual 
subnet is a piece of software that emulates a router on the node. Each virtual subnet 
is able to emulate a number of routers. The combination of all these routers connected 
to tl~e core s«~itcl~es allows ISEAGE to mimic literally l~uridreds of subr~ets providing 
the ability to reproduce large sections of the Internet (4) . Figure 2.7 shows the basic 
structure of the ISEAGE lab. 
ISEAGE's core provides the structure of the virtual Internet, but it alone will not 
provide azl authentic erlvirollment. Internet traffic has a great deal of both malicious 
and non-malicious traffic traversing it at all times between millions of difrerent hosts. To 
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emulate these characteristics in ISEAGE a number of tools are currently being developed. 
Apoc was developed as one of these tools. Other tools include traffic generators to 
provide ISEAGE with a great deal of realistic background traffic. There is a set of attack 
launching tools which allows complex attacks to be easily launched from ISEAGE. Also 
there are virtual hosts and networks which will provide ISEAGE with a large number of 
end nodes to mimic the millions of end hosts on the actual Internet. 
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Ettercap 
Ettercap is touted as a "multipurpose snifter/interceptor/logger for switched networks" (5) . 
Ettercap is a very pov~Terful tool with a great deal of functionality. It can be run as a 
packet snifter, and further used to steal any passwords on the network. It also provides 
the user with the ability to perform a number of Mit1V1 attacks on a local network by 
rYlaYlipulating different protocols. Once Ettercap has established a Mitl~'I attack it can 
perform various modifications to the Internet traffic. Typically these modifications are 
focused on performing some sort of malicious activity. Ettercap's ability to perform 
these modifications is of great interest to the development of Apoc. 
How Ettercap Works 
Once Ettercap has established its Mitts position all of the network traffic to an end 
host ti~Till be routed through Ettercap. Ettercap provides a filter engine for which these 
packets can be passed through and then modified at the user's discretion. This feature 
is known as Etterfilter. Etterfilter is a piece of Ettercap that interprets and executes a. 
user provided filter script. This script instructs Etterfilter to perform specific operations 
to the network traffic. Etterfilter ha.s developed a small language used to express these 
modifications. This language presents a novel method for performing modifications to 
network traffic. An simple example of the Etterfilter langl~age is shown below 
if'(ip.src =_ `192.168.0.1' && ip.ttl == 23) { 
ip.src = `192.168.0.2'; 
} 
else { 
replace ("ethercap" , "P,ttP,rcap") ; 
} 
This program is meant simply to show how the language looks, it does not perform 
any logical function. The If statement checks each packet to see if the source IP address 
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is 192.168.0.1 and the TTL is 23. If a packet is received «Title these characteristics the 
source IP address is changed to 192.168.0.2. Otherwise the else section is performed. 
This section contains the replace function. This function searches the packet for the 
string "ethercap" and replaces it with "ettercap" . 
The Etterfilter language is an ideal approach to controlling the functionality of Apoc. 
Apoc has borrowed the Etterfilter language and slightly modified to more accurately fit 
its needs. Chapter 4 covering the design and implementation of Apoc will further explain 
how this language tivas implemented. 
Netfilter 
Netfilter is a packet manipulation framework built into the Linux kernel. It was first 
introduced in the 2.4 kernel to provide developers with an API which would allow them 
to modify packets in the network stack. Currently the most popular use of Netfilter is 
the iptables fire`~Tall. Iptables is a stateful packet filtering firewall for Linux that was 
built on the Netfilter framework. This section will explain how Netfilter «corks and hove 
it was useful in Apoc's development. 
How Netfilter Works 
Netfilter consists of a number of hook fi~nctions and network related data structures 
built into the Lirlux kernel. Tile hook functions are typically the most popular feature of 
Netfilter as they are useful `Then creating many netti~Torking applications. These hooks 
provide developers with a the ability to directly access packets as they traverse the 
network stack. These hooks are strategically placed into the netv~Tork stack to provide a 
significant amount of control over llow packets are llarldled. Each individual protocol is 
given its own set of hooks, these provide the programmer with control over how packets 
of that protocol traverse the Linux network stack. The following is a list of common 
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book loca,tior~s. 
• PR,E_R,OUTING - V~Then the packet is first read in, before it is processed for 
routing 
• LOCAL IN - If the packet is intended for this host this hook is called before the 
packet is sent for any processes 
• FORVVAR,D - If the packet is destined for another host it passes through this hook 
• LOCAL_OUT -This hook is called for all packets that are created by the local 
host 
• POST_ROUTING -This is the final hook placed after routing has occurred 
Netfilter's hooks are not utilized in the development of Apoc. Hotivever, some of 
Netfilter's other features have been useful. One main idea in Nefilter which has influ-
enced Apoc is its connection tracking ability. Netfilter implements the necessary data 
structures to allow iptables to work as a NAT. This means that Netfilter must provide 
the functionality to translate between the internal and external addresses depending on 
which interface a packet is sent or received. Netfilter's connection tracking schema is 
described below. 
Netfilter's data structures are used to provide the previously mentioned connection 
tracking functionality. The core of the connection tracking is the ip_conntracl~ struct. 
This struct contains connection related information including the status of the connec-
tion, a timeout value used to check if the connection is still active, and two pointers to 
~zp_cv~rarit~r•ac1~_t~uple_hash structs. Each ~ip_cori~rat~racl~_t~uple_hash struct is used to keep 
track of one end of the connection, it also includes a reverse pointer to the zp_conntracl~ 
struct. Figure 2.8 shows the Netfilter connection tracking structures. 
The ip_conntracl~_tuple_hash struct contains the connection tracking information in 
an ~~p_co~rz~rLt~r•ac1~_t~uple struct. The ~ap_co~ra~rzt~rc~ck;_t~uple structs include both the source 
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Figure 2.8 Netfilter connection tracking structures(6) 
and destillatiorl IP addresses and ports along With the upper layer protocol used irl that 
connection. 
Netfilter uses a hash table to keep track of these connections. The key in the hash 
function is the ip_conntracl~_tuple struct. The resulting value from the hash look up is 
a ip_conntracl~_tuple_hash Which contains a reverse pointer to the main ip_conntracl~ 
struct. Whenever a neW packet is received a ip_conntracl~_tuple is created With the 
connection information from that packet, this struct is then hashed and the resulting 
Zp_conntracl~_tuple_hash is returned. The reverse pointer in this struct can be used to 
access the ip_conntracl~ struct where the connection information for the opposing side 
of the connection can be obtained (6) . 
As every received packet requires a hash lookup; it is imperative that the hash 
function produces both fast and stable results. Research in hash function performance 
has yielded the Jenkins hash function as the most appropriate for Netfilter(7) . This is 
significant as Apoc a has need for a hash function With similar qualities. 
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CHAPTER 3 Practical Uses of Apoc 
The goal of Apoc is to irnplerrlent a f'rarrlework that will be able to provide any number 
of possible uses in the future. However, currently there are a number of interesting 
problems for «~hich Apoc can be applied to. These include creating random values in 
packets and spoofing addresses. As Apoc's development was inspired for use in the 
ISEAGE lab; most of its fur~ctior~ality leas been focused toti~'ard solvlzlg current problems 
in ISEAGE. 
Randomization 
One of the most prominent features in Apoc is its ability to create random values for 
various protocol fields. Typically network testbeds lack the pure razldomrless possessed 
by the Internet. The ability to produce random fields in packets can create a network 
environment that appears to be much more chaotic, providing a closer representation to 
Internet . 
The most interesting fields to randomize are IP addresses. Both the source and 
destination addresses can provide difrerent characteristics when they contain random 
values. The benefits of this feature is explained in the follo«~ sections. 
Random Source IP Addresses 
Creating random sol~rce IP's will provide the image that all packets sent to a host are 
done so from a different source host. This is a very useful means to either anonymize the 
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true source of a, rnacllirie or make traffic seem to origiria,te from d, rlurriber of Hosts. This 
can be especially useful when launching attacks from one host. The ability- to anonymize 
the source of these attacks provides a great deal of usefulness to ISEAGE. Real attacks 
may originate from anywhere in the world. However, when launching a.n attack from a 
rletvvork testbed it is much easier to use orle host «~llicll can make the attack appear to 
originate from a number of different sources. 
A number of cyber attacks require a random source address to be accurately por-
trayed in an Internet testbed. These attacks are developed in distributed manner, which 
makes them more difficult to defend against. Examples of distributed attacks include 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and port scans (14) . 
Distributed Denial of Service DoS attacks focus on decreasing the availability 
of a service. Often DoS attacks will send ~, gre~.t deal of traffic to a host, over«~hPlming its 
capabilities to adequately process the resulting information. If' DoS attacks are launched 
from a single host it is easy to block the source of the attack. However, if the attack can 
be performed in a distributed manner it is near impossible to defend against. 
Distributed Port Scans Port scans are another attack than can benefit from 
random source addresses. A port scan is probably the most popular method attackers 
use to gain information on their victim's machines. Port scares take advantage of the 
vc~ay TCP and UDP handle connections. A port scan sends a packet to different ports 
on the victim host and uses the response information to see if there is a service running 
on that host. As port scans are often the first indication an attack is being launched, if 
they are identified the attacking host could easily be blocked. To combat detection, port 
scans can be sent in a distributed way so each packet sent to a port seems to originate 
from a difrerent host . 
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Cyber Defense Competitions Tl~e ability to send packets with rarldorn source 
IP addresses will be very useful in ISEAGE as it is often used to house Cyber Defense 
Competitions. In these competitions Red teams are given a range of IP addresses in 
v~Thich to launch attacks from. However, providing a red team «pith a limited range of 
IP's reduces their ability to provide real world attack scenarios as blue teams cars easily 
recognize a.nd block known malicious IP ranges. Apoc will allo`~~ the red team to use 
any desirable IP address or range of addresses making the attacks appear to come from 
many different areas on the Internet 
Random Destination IP Addresses and TTLs 
Although the creation of random destination addresses by itself is not as interest-
ing as random source address, when combined together they provide some very useful 
functionality, such as creating background traffic. This feature could be coupled with a, 
traffic generation program to gener~.te random backgrol~nd traffic which «Till provide a 
more authentic feel to ISEAGE. 
Another interesting field to randomize is the IP Time to Live, or TTL field. Since 
this field specifies the number of times a packet has been routed, it provides a strong 
indication of ho~~T far the source host is away from the destination host. Sending packets 
with random TTL's will provide a scenario where the packets arriving to a host will all 
seem to come from hosts at different distances. 
MAC address modification 
nne problem cl~rrently being encountered at ISEAGE is a heavy reliance on hubs 
for network connectivity. Switches are typically preferred over hubs as they reduce 
contention in the network, however, they introduce problems in ISEAGE. As ISEAGE 
aims to provide a realistic Internet environment, it must perform a great deal of traffic 
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ger~eratiorl. Switches will prevent generated traffic from being seeY~ by rrlarly hosts as 
the switch will only forward the traffic if the packet's destination MAC address matches 
a host found on that s«itch. 
Apoc will provide a means to bypass this situation by giving the user the ability 
to change the MAC addresses of each packet. This MAC address could be changed to 
either a known host on the sv~~itch or to the broadcast MAC address. ByT sending a packet 
vc~ith a broadcast destination NTAC address, each packet «gill be forwarded through all 
switches it encounters (Figure 3.1) . This helps ISEAGE provide its traffic generation 
abilities without a heavy reliance on hubs. 
~enera~te~d 
Tr~~i ~ 
~ ~it~h 
. ~r~itr~r-~ r~~1 .~ ~~~~~~~ B. E~r~~~d~~~t tv1.~~ ~~d+~r~ 
Figure 3.1 Bypassing switches with broadcast IVTACs 
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CHAPTER 4 Design and Implementation 
This section will provide the reader with a greater understanding how Apoc works 
and the problems that were overcome in its development. It will begin by explaining 
the basic process of reading, modifying, and «~riting a packet. It `~~ill continue to explain 
how the Etterfilter language was utilized and ho«T connection tracking is performed. 
Finally it will conclude «~itll azl explanation of rriajor problems encountered during tl~e 
development process. 
Basic structure 
The basic structure is implemented ti~Tith three interfaces. The first two interfaces are 
used to intercept the traffic between the communicating hosts. These two interfaces are 
frequently referred to as the filtering interfaces. Typically one interface is connected to 
ISEAGE, «Thile the other interface will be directly connected to either a single host or 
a small subnet of hosts through a hub or switch. Apoc's third interface is the control 
interface. This allows the user to remotely control Apoc `~~ithout interfering with the 
network traffic it processes. 
Since every packet received on the filtering interface must be forwarded; Apoc im-
plements avert' simple packet forv~Tarding scheme. Packets are read in on one interface, 
solve number of Ynodifications are performed to the packet, and the packet is written 
out the opposing interfaces. As Internet traffic is fully duplexed; Apoc simultaneously 
reads, modifies, and writes traffic on both interfaces. 
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As there are two separate interfaces collsta.rltly reading and ~vritirlg packets, Apoc 
utilizes threads to more efficiently accomplish this process. When Apoc is started both 
interfaces receive their own thread; this thread is responsible for reading any packets 
from that interface; modifying them, and writing them out the opposing interface. The 
use of threads vas based upon the ability to write code that more accurately represents 
the problem. 
The thread library used by Apoc is the POSIX Threads (Pthreads) library. Pthreads 
provides a very straight forward method of spawning and controlling threads. When 
Apoc begins running each interface receives its own thread; this thread will also receive 
its own filter script which is must parse and execute. Figure 4.1 shows how Apoc's 
threaded architecture. 
T~r~~~ 
Interf~~~ ~ Ir~t~rf~~~ 1 
''NRftR~6~!!!Aly~6!■!!l+~rlrrrlr~rrrrr•if~:~.:~~~.M:~.i;M:r-r~ 
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Tf~ ~~ ~ ~ 1 '''' ~ `r~it ~ 
P ;~ ~ I~~t 
I~~a~if~► 
P~~I~~t 
Reading Packets 
F~.E'. ~ ~ 
P~ci~et 
Figure 4.1 Apoc's threaded structure 
Each packet must be read and processed on the filtering interfaces. Apoc needs 
access to each packet that arrives on these interfaces. T~lls functionality is provided 
with the Pcap library. The Packet Capture Library or Pcap is described in the man 
page as "a high level interface to packet capture systems" (8). The Pcap library provides 
a number of functions that allo«T a developer to read packets arriving on a specified 
network interface. Pcap is especially useful wllerl a program irl interested irl reading 
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every packet tllat a.rl interface sees. Pcap places the interface into promiscuous mode so 
that every packet that arrives on that interface ~~Till be read. 
when using Pcap the programmer must first specify the interface on which packet 
capturing is desired, this is performed through the pcap_open_live function. This func-
tion accepts the name of the interface on «'bleb packet capturing will be perforrrled as 
an argument, it also accepts additional arguments which are not of interest here. Once 
pcap is initialized with pcap_open_live, it returns a packet capture descriptor which is 
passed to other pcap functions as an argument to specify the device to capture on. Pcap 
provides a number of functions to read packets, but Apoc only utilizes the pcap loop 
function. This function is provided the packet capture descriptor received during the 
pcap_open_live function. pcap loop also accepts the name of a callback function as an 
argument. V~Then a packet is received on the interface Pcap calls the callback function 
and sends it a buffer containing a entire packet, this function can then be used to process 
each packet. The pcap loop function is ideal for Apoc as it performs packet capturing 
in a loop, by continually capturing and processing packets. 
After a packet is passed to Apoc by the Pcap library, it will execute the contents of 
the filter script onto the packet. This begins by first performing some classifications of 
the packet. The packet and the specific protocols used in that packet are stored in a 
general struct used for all future packet modification functions. 
Packet Modification/The Etterfilter Language 
The modification of packet in Apoc is based entirely on the scripts provided by the 
user. The language used by Apoc was lleavily based orl that used irl Etterfilter. Tllis 
section will explain how this language has been implemented and how it is used to 
perform modifications to packets. 
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Control Structures 
The modification process was implemented to exactly follow the script specified by 
the user. This insures that the packet modifications exactly follow the structure intended 
by the user. Etterfilter implements a number of control structs which represent the basic 
control structures in the Etterfilter language. There are four basic control structs used 
to iinpleinent this structure; these are blocl~, single_instr, ifblocl~, and condZtion. Apoc 
borrows these structures from Etterfilter, but implements its o`vn end structures used 
during that actual conditional and instructional statements. The rest of this section «Till 
explain the Backus-Naur Form (BNF) for these main structures and describe how they 
are implemented in Apoc. 
Block The most abstract component of this language is a blocl~. A block can consist 
of either an if' statement or a single instruction; it also may contains another block. This 
allows the language to have many different blocks chained together. The Backus-Naur 
Form (BNF) for a block is shown below. 
(blocl~) ::_ (single instruction) (block) 
~ (if statement) (block) 
~ (if else statement) (block) 
~ NULL 
when a block is found while parsing the language a corresponding block struct is 
created, this struct contains pointers to the related control structs. This block struct is 
shown below. 
k~l~~k 
struct single_instr ~~ins; 
struct ifbtock '~ifb; 
struct bt©ck *n~~t; 
int type; 
Figure 4.2 block stuct 
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Single Instruction A s~l~ragle ~l~ras~t~r•uctzo~rz is a simple structure that represents some 
operation to be performed, this will typically signify some modification to a packet. This 
modification can be either a simple instruction such as changing a value in a protocol 
header or a more complex change which can be specified through the use of a function. 
Both of these types of modifications «gill be described irl greater detail later in the 
document. 
(si~rzgle_i~rast~r~uct~~on) ::_ (~i~rZst~r~uct~iorL) ; 
If and if/else statements are used to perform conditional operations. These provide 
the user `vith a means to determine if certain condition has occurred when a packet is 
inspected. This implements control over when a modification `will be performed. These 
conditional statements are contained in an ifblocl~ struct. 
(if statement) ::= if ((conditional block)) (block) 
(if else statement) ::= if ((conditional block)) (block) else (block) 
ifbl©cl~ 
struct canditir~n ~*cQnds; 
struct block *~blk; 
struct block ~~els~blk; 
Figure 4.3 ifblock stuct 
Finally a. condition block structure is provided to implement conditional statements. 
A conditional statement may consist of a number of individual conditions which can be 
linked together with and (~~) or or (~ ~) operators. 
(condition block) ::_ (condition) 
(conditional block) && (conditional block) 
~conditional_block~ ~~ (conditional block) 
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Offsets 
A key component Of the Etterfilter language is an offset. Offsets are used to specify 
fields within protocols. An offset represents a range Of bits starting some number Of bits 
from the beginning of the packet. For example, the offset to the source address in an IP 
packet is the tti~~elfth byte in the IP header and spans through the sixteenth byte. This 
information can be used t0 locate the proper data in a packet in «~hich can then be used 
to perform some operation. Offsets are represented in this language as a pairing Of the 
protocol and fields name in the following format protocol., field. 
In order for Apoc to transform an offset into usable information it borrows the method 
used in the Etterfilter language. This method uses a configuration file that is read when 
the Apoc loads. This file contains the necessary offset information for all the protocols 
understood by Apoc. Each protocol contains its own section in this file containing the 
name of the protocol and the level it lives on. For each protocol it contains the name of 
each field along with the length of that field and the location of the field in the protocol 
header. Protocols are described v~Tith a line like ~ip~f~~ stating that the string "ip" maps 
to the name of a protocol on the network layer. Fields are specified with a line such as 
src:.~ = 1,2, this states that the string "src" is a field in the IP protocol. The size of that 
field is 4 bytes and the field is found 12 bytes into the IP header. Below is the entire 
configuration section for the IP protocol. 
[ipl [3l 
hl ver:l = U 
tos:1 = 1 
len:2 = 2 
id:2 = 4 
frags:2 = 6 
ttl:l = 8 
proto:l = 9 
csum:2 = lU 
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src:4 = 12 
dst:4 = 16 
when Apoc parses the script and finds an offset it fills a struct containing the relevant 
field information. V~'hen performing the operations to a specified offset Apoc looks at 
this struct and can map the data of the offset, size; and layer to the implied location in 
the packet. 
Offsets are used whenever a field must be specified. They are commonly used in two 
different methods. The first method where they are used is in a conditional statement. 
Here some vall~e is compared to an offset to check if the data in the packet, is egl~al to 
Borne specified data. The second method is in an assignment statement. Here Borne value 
is assigned to an offset. This modifies the corresponding data in the packet to contain 
the data specified in the assignment statement. 
Functions 
The Etterfilter language also lets the user perform special modifications with the use 
of functions. A function produces a mechanism in `which user can specify more abstract 
concepts. Currently function support is limited to only supporting the randomize and 
drop functions, these are described below. 
• randomize —This function tells Apoc to create a random value for some field. The 
first argument to this function is the offset of the field which `~~ill be changed. 
The second and third let the programmer specify the lower and l~pper limit of the 
random value. Tile random values are received by reading fr•orn tale ~dev/~ecr•arLdorra 
device on the system. 
• drop -This function simply drops a packet. 
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Scanning and Parsing the language 
Apoc must be able to interpret the information provided in the filter script. Ettercap 
already has performed a great deal of the preliminary work necessary to interpret the 
Etterfilter language, including the scanning and parsing. Apoc is able to modify these 
techniques for its own needs. The process of scanning and parsing this language is 
described below. 
Flex Flex is an open source tool used to generate a lexical analyzer. A lexical 
analyzer or scanner is a tool that performs pattern matching on some input. Flex is 
provided ~, configl~ration file explaining the variol~s distinct patterns that occl~r in a 
language. These distinct patterns are often known as tokens. The lexical analyzer will 
then search through an input and return each individual token it reads. The tokens can 
be either directly specified or described through regular expressions. Tokens that are 
directly specified ~,re concrete terms sl~ch as ~;f, else, ;, etc. Regl~lar expressions are used 
to match tokens that are not concrete and must be matched through their patterns. For 
example, in a typical programming language variables and function names are matched 
through this method. Here regular expressions are extensively used to match different 
types of data formats. An example regular expression from the Etterfilter language 
is ~ `~0-9~{1,3}~.[0-9~{1,3}\.[0-9~{1,3}\.~0-9~{1,~}~'. This expression matches an IPv4 
address. ti'Vhenever the lexical analyzer sees an input ~~cThich matches this pattern it will 
return an IPv4 token. 
Flax works by first reading a user generated inpl~t file ti~~hich describes each individual 
token irl the language. After reading this file Flex generates the lexical analyzer in C. 
Once the lexical analyzer has been created it can be called by the yylex(~ function. Each 
time this function is called it will return the next token from the language. Typically 
this function is called from the a parser such as Bison `which is explained in the next 
section. 
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Bison Bison is arl open source parser generator. Once the grarnrria,r for tl~e lan-
guage is specified Bison `~~ill generate a C program that «gill parse that grammar. To 
create the parser generator the user must specify the grammar in a configuration file. 
Apoc extends the configuration file from the Etterfilter language to generate the parser. 
The Bisorl parser is dependent oil Flex for obtaining tokens. Bison receives tokens from 
calls to Flex's yylex(~ function, as Bison receives tokens from Flex it matches the received 
tokens to a set of rules specified in the grammar. 
Bison creates parsers for context free grammars. A context free grammar consists 
to two types of statement, terminals and non-terminals. Terminal statements are the 
atomic units in the language. These terminal statements are the lexical tokens returned 
by the Flex scanner. Non terminal statements are not atomic, they can consist of com-
binations of non-terminals a.nd terminals, these represent the way a language constructs 
groups of tokens to create meaningful statements. Context free gralnlnar are often dis-
played in BNF syntax. Here all of the non-terminals are shown on the left side of a rule 
and their definitions are displayed on the right side. Examples of the BNF syntax were 
shown in the Control Structure section. 
Modifications to the language 
The language used by Apoc; is alrriost identical to that produced for Etterfilter. 
However, there are a few areas tivhere the language has been modified to meet Apoc's 
needs. 
Apoc has added extra tokens to represent desired data formats. The first token added 
is a 1V1AC address token. This lets the user specify MAC addresses in their typical colon 
delimited format. The second token added is a CIDR address token. This provides the 
user with a means to match entire ranges of IP addresses. 
Another area v~There the Etterfilter language falls short of Apoc's needs is that it does 
riot perform parsing of furlctiori argurrlerits. This is a desirable feature as rriazly furlctiorl 
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argunlerlts are tokens in this language. By parsing these values Apoc will perform arly 
necessary data conversion to that token. This greatly reduces the ot-erhead in function 
writing as the developer does not perform any data conversion techniques. 
Writing Packets 
Once a packet is read in and any relevant modifications have been performed the 
packet is ready to be written to the interface. This is accomplished with Libnet library. 
Libnet has a more programmer friendly API than the traditional Unix sockets a.nd 
provides functions useful in ~~c~riting packets to an interface. All packet writing in Apoc 
is performed thol~ght the Libnet library. In order to create a packet ~~~ith Libnet the 
user must first initialize a Libnet context, this context is the basic structure used control 
the packet creation process. A Libnet context is created with the lzbnet_znzt function, 
this function also accepts the type of injection to be performed. Apoc uses the injection 
type LIBNET_LINK_ADV, which provides ApOC the ablllty to send packets on the link 
layer. 
Apoc uses Libnet in a, method that varies slightly from its traditional use. Libnet is 
generally used to create packets from scratch. However, since Apoc has already has a 
filly developed packet it has no need to rc~crcate the packet. Apoc only needs a method 
to write the already developed packet to the network. If the packet has been modified 
the proper protocol checksums must be recomputed. The libnet_do_checl~sum function 
is used to recompute these checksums. 
Once the checksum is created the l~;bn,et, a,dv ~~~r~;te l~;nk, fl~nction is used to write the 
packet. A pointer to tl~e packet and the length of tl~e packet is passed to this function. 
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Connections Tracking 
In order for Apoc to accur-a.tely perform its duties it needs to be a very stateful system. 
This is largely due to the connection oriented paradigm present in many networking 
protocols. As a result changing a certain field in a packet may result in what appears 
to be an entirely different connection to the machine receiving that packet. A good 
example of this are IP addresses and TCP/ UDP parts. A cllarlge to arl IP address 
tells the packet it is destined for an entirely different machine; `~~hile a change to a port 
number will result in a packet being directed towards a different application on the host. 
If any of these sensitive fields arc changed it requires that all future packets in this 
corirlectiorl also perform these changes. 
Connection tracking was discussed earlier in the section covering Netfilter. Apoc has 
very similar needs to Netfilter for connection tracking. Netfilter's connection tracking 
schema ~cTas a strong influence in Apoc's development. V~~hile Apoc uses Netfilter's 
corlrlectiozl tracking for its basic design it simplifies the idea by limiting the number of 
structs used and eliminating some unneeded fields. 
Apoc uses two main structs for connection tracking, conntracl~ and conn end. These 
are displayed in figure 4.4. The conntracl~ struct contains pointers to two different 
conn end structs. The first conn end struct contains the connection information which 
matches how packets «rill be seen on the first interface. The second conn_end struct 
contains the connection information as seen on the second interface. 
corir~tr~~~k 
ifs ~~r~n ~r~~ 
ifl ~carir~ ~r~~ 
~~r 
a 
cor~r~ en~i 
s r~ ~~~ r~ 
Est ~d~ r~~s 
s r~_ ~ ~ rt 
~dst_p~ rt 
Figure 4.4 Apoc; connection tracking structures 
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Connection Tracking Algorithm 
This section will describe the how the corinectlorl tracking is actually performed. 
First a conn_end struct is created for every new coming connection. This struct is then 
hashed to retrieve the corresponding conntracl~ struct. If no hash entry is available it 
can be assumed that this is a new connection, ho`~~ever; if an entry is found for that 
hash table it can be concluded this packet is part of an already established connection. 
These two situations will be described in the follotiving two paragraphs. 
If the packet is part of a new connection a conntracl~ struct will be created for that 
packet. Then any necessary modifications will be performed to this packet. After these 
modifications are performed the reverse conn_end struct will be created. If any connec-
tion related modifications were performed this conn_end will represent the changes to 
the connection. This conn end struct will then be inserted into the hash table v~Tith the 
location of the conntracl~ struct as the hash value. 
If the initial hash lookup results in a non null value it is assumed that the packet 
is part of an existing connection. The return value of the hash lookup will be the 
address of the corresponding conntracl~ struct. After this struct is obtained the necessary 
modifications will be applied to the packet. After the modifications are performed the 
reverse conn end is obtained from the conntracl~ struct and that connection information 
is applied to the packet. 
This process has the negative P,~P,Ct of allo«Ting only static connections throl~ghol~t the 
life of the Apoc session. Once a connection is created it will remain intact indefinitely. 
There is no means to further modify a connection after it has been established. 
Hash Table 
The hash function used in Apoc is the same Jenkins hash function used in Netfil-
ter. This function provides an ideal hashing algorithm for Apoc's needs. Since Apoc's 
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corlrlectiorl trackirig~ liasli is very similar to Netfilter's it earl be safely assumed that 
this hash function will provide Apoc with optimum performance. Apoc does not use the 
code directly from Netfilter. Instead Apoc uses a slightly different implementation of the 
Jenkins hash function. Although this code implements the same algorithm it provides 
a slightly difrererlt interface to the functions. This implementation has been borrowed 
from the XML-Lit project from Sourceforge (9) . 
Problems 
A number of interesting problems `~~ere encountered in the development of Apoc. 
Two interesting problems referred to as pacl~et reiteration and ambiguous connections. 
This section will describe these problems in detail and explain how they were overcome 
in Apoc. 
Packet Reiteration 
Apoc has very similar characteristics to a network gate«gay as they are both lased 
to forward traffic between two hosts. However, Apoc differs in that packets are never 
addressed directly to it. Apoc reads packets addressed to other machines and for`vards 
them, meaning that Apoc must read packets in promiscuous mode. Apoc's reliance on 
interfaces in promiscuous mode presents an interesting problem, which is referred to as 
pacl~et ~r•eiter•at~~o~rz. 
Packet reiteration occurs when Apoc writes a packet to an interface which is reading 
and forwarding every packet it sees. Every time a packet is v~Tritten to an interface it 
v~~ill be immediately read by the opposing interface. Since this interface also reads and 
forwarding packets, every packet will coritir~ually be passed tllrougll the systerrl. Figure 
4.5 below shows the problem of packet reiteration as a packet will travel in a cycle 
throughout Apoc indefinitely. 
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To address this problem Apoc must be able to identify packets «~hich have already 
been processed. Once these packets are identified they need to be dropped. Apoc handles 
this situation by remembering recently written packets. Each time a packet is read on 
an interface it can be compared to the packets recently written to that interface. If their 
is a rriatcli it can be assumed that the packet was already processed by Apoc; and earl 
be safely dropped. 
To elaborate on this problem it is important to describe the «~orkings of the net«pork 
stack on a typical operating system. l~lodern operating systems such as FreeBSD and 
Liriux place packets into a queue directly after they are react fr•orrl tl~e interface (11) (10) . 
When a packet is read it is added to the queue where it waits to be processed. When 
the operating system is ready to process the packet it will take the packet from queue. 
This means there their may be a number of packets `~~aiting to be processed by Apoc a.t 
a11v one moment. 
Apoc implements a queue of packets which have been recently written. This queue 
is used to mirror the queue in the operating system. Each packet written by Apoc is 
appended to this queue, while each new packet read is compared with the first packet 
in this queue. A match signifies that a packet has been previously processed and needs 
to be dropped from further processing. Figure 4.6 shows how an incoming packet is 
compared v~Tith recently «~ritten packets. 
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Figure 4.6 Avoiding packet reiteration 
The queue of recently written packets is implemented with a linked list. The list's 
ends are moderated ~~c~ith a written p1~ts struct, this struct maintains a pointer to the 
first and last packet in the queue. Packets are represented with a w~1~t struct. This 
struct simply contains a pointer to a packet, the length of that packet, a,nd a pointer 
to the next w~k;t in the queue. Each interface maintains its own queue for the packets 
v~~ritten to that particular interface. The head packet on the queue is compared to each 
packet read on that interface allowing each interface to efliciently identify and eliminate 
any repeat processing of the packet. 
Ambiguous Connections 
Apoc's connection tracking ability was established previously in this section. Al-
though this is an interesting feature it can hinder the natural packet flow through Apoc. 
It is important to note that connection tracking is only possible if each connection end is 
entirely 1~nigl~e. An ambiglzous connection «gill be created if a packet cannot be properly 
forwarded do to insufficient information on that connection. 
Nlodifications to source IP addresses will indirectly lead to a problem with ambigu-
ous connections. Here we will refer to an IP that has been modified by Apoc as an 
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~u~ra~rLczt~cc~r•al IP. Tlie problem is that other protocols such as ARP will use this unnatural 
IP. Since ARP does not utilize a port number it cannot properly utilize the connection 
tracking functionality. The next paragraph will explain how ARP packets can create an 
am iguous connection. 
If a host wants to respond to a packet received from an unnatural IP it will ARP for 
that MAC address. This ARP packet must be forwarded through Apoc, which needs 
to change the unnatural IP to the original IP address. The ARP reply will then be 
forwarded through Apoc changing the original IP address back to the unnatural IP. 
Since ARP does not contain a port number it cannot access the necessary connection 
information. If there is more than one connection using the original address, Apoc will 
not be able to decide «Tith connection that ARP packet belongs to. Hence, the packet 
cannot be forwarded. Here an ambiguous connection has been developed. 
To handle this situation Apoc implements another hash table. This is used to Ina.p 
unnatural IP addresses to the MAC addresses which they originated from. The IP from 
every ARP request is then looked up in this table. If a match is found Apoc `will drop 
the ARP request and continue to send its ow-n ARP reply with the MAC address it 
received from the table. While Apoc naturally seeks to be a transparent entity; this is a 
situation where it is required to usurp the natural flow of the network traffic. 
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CHAPTER 5 Results 
This section intends to show the results of Apoc. It will begin by showing how Apoc 
is used. It `~~ill then show the current state of Apoc's functionality in its ability to handle 
problems in which it ~~.~as developed to solve. ~~Vhile Apoc's utility extends well beyond 
these core problems, most of these features have not been sufficiently tested to provide 
anv feedback on their effectiveness. 
Useage 
Currently Apoc allows the user to provide two options when run. These options are 
specified by the -o and -~ flags. The -o flag is follo~~Ted by the filename of the filter script 
to be executed by first interface orl that system, while the -1 flag accepts the filename 
for the second interface's filter script. Examples of Apoc being run are shown below. 
. /apoc 
./apoc -1 scrzpt~ 
./apoc -o scriptl -1 script 
The first example executes Apoc `without any filter scripts, it will perform basic 
packet forwarding. The second example sho`~• Apoc being run with just a filter script 
for the second interface, here the first interface will perform basic forwarding. The third 
example sho«~s Apoc with a filter script for both interfaces. 
The filter scripts can provide a wide range of functionality. Some example scripts 
are shown below. 
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~cf(tcp.dst == 80~{ 
ip.dst = `19 .168.1.100'; 
} 
This first script will tell Apoc to work as a Destination NAT. Here all packet that 
are sent to a web server can be redirected to a specified server at 192.168.1.100. 
random~ip. src, `1.1.1.1 ', `~55. X55. X55. ~55'J; 
random~ip.dst, `1.1.1.1', `~55.~55.,255.~55'J; 
random~ip.ttl, 5, 1,27J; 
This script modifies packets to have completely random source and destination IP 
addresses along with random TTLs. This might be useful in random traffic generation. 
if (ip. dst = _ `198.. 1.0..E ' ( ~ ip. dst = _ `1 X8.8.10.90' ( ~ ip. dst = _ `19~. 8.1.1 ~'~ { 
ip. dst = `10.10.10. ~'; 
} 
This script is used to reroute packets destined f'or a particular host to another host. 
In this example packets sent to root DNS servers are routed to another server. 
ip. csum = Ux1,2~35; 
} 
else{ 
ip. csum = 0x1 ~~.~; 
} 
This script can be used to send packets with bad IP checksums. This could used to 
test how a machine handles malformed packets. 
if'(ip.dst =_ `192.168.0.0/16'){ 
eth. dst = `ff.•ff.ff.;ff:•ff.•ff '; 
} 
4U 
Tllls script changes the MAC address to tl~e broadcast address if a packet is destined 
for the 192.168.0.0/ 16 address range. This could be useful to convince a switch to 
forward the packets. 
Network Performance 
Network perfor•mazlce is a very important feature of Apoc. For Apoc to be a useful 
tool it is necessary that it does not introduce any significant performance degradation 
into the net`vork. In order to accurately measure Apoc's performance two different tests 
were performed. 
The first test is was performed «~ith Iperf, which is tool designed specifically to test 
the bandtividth of a connection. Here one host is configured as a server and another as a 
client. Then Iperf client sends 8-KB data packets to the server for 10 seconds (12) . At the 
end of this period Iperf reports how much data was received at the server. This test was 
performed four times with a straight connection between two hosts and then four times 
having all packets passing through Apoc. The straight through connection produced an 
average of 55.5 Mbits/sec while the Apoc test managed only 3.75 Mbits/sec. 
The previous testing method was fairly one dimensional. It only created one TCP 
connection which all data was passed through. This a poor test for two reasons. First, it 
does not test Apoc's ability to handle a large number of connections, and second, it does 
not adequately represent typical Internet traffic. Due to these reasons another method 
has been created to more thoroughly test Apoc's ability to handle more abstract net`vork 
traffic. This test uses Nmap to scan a host. Nmap makes for an excellent test tool 
because it will create thousands of connections placing Apoc under a high load. Nmap 
also reports how long the scan took, which can be used to determine the performance 
of Apoc. 
Nmap scans were performed first on a direct connection, then through Apoc with 
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any rnodificatiorls, finally four scans were run with Apoc creating ra,ndorri source IP 
addresses vc~ith the following script. 
random~ip. src, '10.1.1.1 ', '10.10.10. ,255'; 
The zlmap scans were performed with the -sT option to create full TCP connections, 
each test scanned 1667 ports. The direct scans averaged 10.885 seconds per scan «lhile 
scans through Apoc averaged 12.658. Performing random source IP address creation 
significantly increased the length of the scan to 24.554 seconds. 
From these results it is apparent that there are serious performance problems in the 
operation of Apoc. V~Thile the nmap test performed appropriately the results of the 
Iperf test were unacceptable. The source of the bottleneck is currently unknown. Initial 
testing has shown that neither the connection tracking or the packet reiteration modules 
are responsible for these results. A current hypothesis is that the problem inay be the 
direct result of the threaded nature of the code. This needs to be further researched 
before Apoc can be considered a reliable tool. 
It should also be noted that there was a large discrepancy in the machines used to 
test Apoc. Apoc ~~~as run on a 1 Ghz Pentium III with 384NIB of RAIV1, running Ubuntu 
5.04. One end node was represented by a 1.8 Ghz Pentium Centrino «.pith 512I~IB of 
RAM running Debian Linux. The opposing host is a 233 Mhz Pentium II with 32 I~TB 
of RAM running FreeBSD 5.4. 
Testing 
The testing of Apoc has been performed from a number of angles. Currently testing 
on Apoc has been primarily focused on the correct implementation of the language 
features. A number of scripts have been developed to attempt to fully test different 
aspects of the language. These tests were performed by replaying large amount of 
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network traffic with approxirrlately thirty tllousalld packets at a slow speed as to not 
incur any dropped packets. 
The first test was developed to check Apoc's ability to handle nested zf statements 
and various operators such as > _, <, and > . This test script is shown in Appendix A, 
Testing Nested If Statements. The script checks the value of the IP checksum, wlllch 
it then used to attempt to weight the modification of source IP a.ddresses by using a 
number of if statements. The result of this test shows that every modified source IP 
is found in the resulting network traffic. This result of this test provides evidence that 
both nested if statements and operators are implemented correctly. l~7ore information 
concerning this test is also found in Appendix A. 
After Apoc's ability to accurately modify a particular field `~~as derived, further 
testing was performed to provide feedback on the implementation of the conditional 
statements. This test was developed to analyze Apoc's ability to handle multiple con-
ditional statements. An Apoc script was developed with t~vo separate if statements, 
the first if statement contained three conditions grouped together with the and opera-
tor. The second if statement contained three conditions grouped together with the or 
operator. The same data from the previous test was then replayed through Apoc to 
check when the conditions were recognized. If a packet matching a condition vc~as found, 
it was marked by modifying the Ethernet header to be either all 0's or 1's. After the 
test was run the original packets were loaded into Ethereal and the packets were passed 
through the same conditional statements on Ethereal. This provides that actual number 
of packets which met the specified statements. This test had negative results. Certain 
packets were marked by Apoc; without meeting the required conditions. This signifies 
that Apoc currently does not handle conditional statements correctly. Some results from 
this test can be viewed in Appendix A, Testing Conditional Statements. 
The final group of tests focused on the correct implementation of the offsets supported 
by the l~,ngllage. C11rrPntly thPrP are six protocols supported in Apoc; Ethernet, ARP, 
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IP, ICMP, TCP, grid UDP. A separate test has been developed for each protocol. Tl~e 
tests «ere intended to assure that the packet values modified by Apoc directly match the 
bits modified in the packets. Each modifiable field was tested on each protocol. After 
each test the packets were reviewed to assure that they conformed to the fields specified 
in the Apoc script. All results of the this test were favor-a.ble. Some results from these 
tests can be seen in Appendix A, Testing Proper Offsets. 
Future Testing 
Although replaying network traffic provides a significant amount of information on 
Apoc's fi~nctionality, it falls to test certain featl~res. Since all replayed traffic originates 
from one host, Apoc is unable to properly perform connection tracking. Hence, con-
nection tracking cannot be properly tested ti~rith replayed network traffic. To accurately 
test Apoc's connection tracking ability it must have access to live network traffic. Also, 
tests with live netv~Tork traffic provides the only means to assl~re that Apoc will operate 
eflectively in a real environment. Thorough tests with live network traffic have not yet 
been performed. The following section v~~ill provide the scenario for which future testing 
of Apoc should undergo. 
First their shol~ld be multiple hosts comml~nication through Apoc. V~Thile it is not 
feasible to setup a large number of hosts for a test; amore moderate number is proposed. 
For this test eight hosts vc~ill be used, with four on each side of Apoc. These can be 
configured ti~Tith multiple IP addresses to emulate more hosts. Various servers shall be 
set up on these hosts, which will be accessed to create the network traffic. 
Once the test machines are configured, the test traffic should be carefully selected. 
This traffic must be chosen to accurately portray all types of network traffic. This 
traffic should contain large amounts of IP, ARP, TCP, UDP, and ICMP packets to test 
all of Apoc's supported protocols. However, testing should also include protocols not 
supported by Apoc, such as IPv6 or IPsec. This will test Apoc's ability to Dandle 
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unsupported protocols. Traffic shall consist of large file transmissions such as FTP 
session as well as smaller transmissions such as a port scans. Port scans are particularly 
useful in testing the connection tracking ability. It should also include other common 
traffic such as HTTP, SSH, and DNS. 
Test traffic should also colltairl a significant amouzlt of malicious traffic, as Apoc 
v~Till often be used to forward attacks. This will test Apoc's ability to handle traffic 
v~Thich deviates from typical Internet traffic. One major source of malicious traffic should 
originate from various vulnerability scanning tools as Apoc will often be used to forward 
traffic from these scans during Cyber Defense Competitions. This traffic shall also 
include any traffic which may be used to avoid IDS systems, as these attacks contain 
traffic with very unusual fingerprints, which may disrupt the flow of traffic through Apoc. 
Once the traffic has been sent their must be an efficient method to determine if all 
traffic was accurately received. The most obvious method is derived from the accessibility 
of the network services. If all services work correctly there will be evidence that all data 
is being properly forwarded. More evidence of this can be found if by saving pca.p files of 
all netv~Tork traffic. By interpreting these files in Ethereal individual connections can be 
traced. Comparing both sides of a connection in this manner will provide information 
if the traffic was properly forwarded or if a.ny packet loss `vas incurred. 
The previously explained testing methodologies will provide sufficient evidence of 
Apoc's functionality. Current tests on Apoc show that there are some areas which are 
still problematic. However, future tests are need to provide adequate feedback concerning 
Apoc's functionality. 
45 
CHAPTER 6 Summary 
The goal of Apoc was to provide the user with absolute c;orltrol over the traffic passed 
through it. Currently Apoc provides many methods through which this traffic can be 
modified. The basic problems which spawned Apoc's development such as changing 
l~'IAC and IP addresses can be easily performed. Apoc's functionality extends «Tell 
beyond tllese features to provide control of any illforlrlatioll found in popular Interllet 
protocols. 
In the Results section it was established that many features have been tested with 
favorable results. Apoc performs many packet modifications as desired and is able to 
Illa.11lta~lll the proper state by performing COIlIlect1011 tracking. However, it ~~~as also 
established that Apoc suffers from some significant performance problems and also has 
small problems with language interpretation. This problem may hinder Apoc's ability 
to perform its required tasks. 
There are numerous areas where Apoc will benefit from extended work. However, 
due to time constraint `work on Apoc has been limited to the scope covered in this 
paper. These areas extend from additional features which will extend Apoc's packet 
modification abilities to more rigorous testing which will ensure Apoc's survivability. 
Areas that will particularly benefit from extended work are covered in the next section. 
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CHAPTER 7 ~.iture Work 
One key idea in the development of Apoc was flexibility. Since Apoc will have 
complete access to the traffic intended to a group of hosts it has the potential for a 
number of more advanced features. Apoc has been designed in a method that will 
provide future users with the ability add functions without an overwhelming amount of 
overhead. 
Additional Protocols Support 
while Apoc currently can handle most popular protocols it still lacks full support 
in this area. Two popular protocols that remain unsupported in Apoc are 802.11 and 
IPv0. Although these protocols are fairly popular they are zlot as commonly used as 
Ethernet and IPv4. Both IPv6 and 802.11 are rather complex and will be difficult to 
implement. 
Performance 
Apoc's performance results are far from ideal. Although performance was taken 
into account during the design and implementation, adetailed review of the code will 
most likely yield areas which could be streamlined. As Apoc vain potentially be used on 
netv~Torks with high data rates it is important that its efficiency is maximized. 
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Packet Data Modification 
Olre useful feature «~llicll Apoc lacks is tl~e ability to perform Irlodifications to a 
packet's application data. Support for this could be provided with ofrsets as was done 
v~~ith lower layer protocols. Also general search and replace functions should be imple-
mented ti~~hich could be used t0 perform these tasks. 
Testing 
Testing for Apoc was performed in a very limited environment. ~ uch more testing 
should be performed to ensure that Apoc is able t0 properly handle large amounts Of 
traffic from numerous hosts. This testing should be performed in an environment ~~lith 
a large number Of hosts and a significant anloullt Of Ilet`~~ork traffic. 
Currently Apoc has only been tested on Debian Linux based systems, ho«lever it 
would ideally run on any Unix system. Many machines in the ISEAGE lab utilize the 
FreeBSD operating system, therefore, most future testing Of Apoc should be performed 
OIl t111S OS. 
} 0000 
} 0010 
else{ 0420 
ip.src = '10.10.10.10'; 0030 
} 
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APPENDIX A Test Results 
This Appendix contains previously mentioned test results. The goal of the following 
tests was to assess the implementation of the language. 
Testing Nested If Statements 
The first test was introduced to analyze Apoc's ability to handle nested if statements. 
It also tests some of Apoc's comparison operators such as > and <_. This script 
attempts to modify source IP addresses based on a weighted distribution by the IP 
checksum. The script and results are shown in figure A.l. 
Apac 5cri pt Resu Iti ng pickets 
if~: ip.csum ~ 32?6?►{ 1 0.000000 10.10.10.10 -> 192.158.23.1 TCP 3? 0?1 > ssh [ACk:] 
00 90 4? 05 59 65 00 00 e8 12 6d 3a 08 00 45 08 ..G.Ye....m: E. 
00 34 99 3a 40 00 3f 06 b6 c4 Oa Oa Oa Oa c0 a8 .4.:~.? 
1? O1 90 cf 00 15 ?3 84 04 30 ee 5f O1 15 80 10  s..0.o.... 
28 40 6e 1? 00 00 O1 O 1 08 Oa 53 f0 64 Oe 53 eb ~~n S.d.S. 
29 09 ~. 
if~:ip.csum >= 163831{ 
if~ip.csutn > 245? 4:~{ 0000 
ip.src = '10.10.10.?'; 0010 
} 0020 
else{ 0030 
ip.src = '10.10.10,8'; 0040 
} 
} 
else{ 10 0.068994 10.10.10.8 -> 192.168.25.0 ICF1P Echo Ipingl request 
ip.src = '10.10.10.9'; 
00 00 e8 12 6d 3a 00 90 4? 05 59 65 08 00 45 00 ....m:..G.Ye..E. 
00 lc 88 59 00 00 35 O1 Of ce Oa Oa Oa 08 c0 a8 ...Y..S 
19 00 OS 00 db of 6a cb b1 84 00 00 00 00 00 00  j 
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
20 0.100146 10.10.10.9 -> 192.168.25.3 TCP 43397 > ~nrnrnr [ACK] 
6000 00 00 e8 12 6d 3a 00 90 4? 05 59 65 08 00 45 00 ....m:..G.Ye..E. 
0010 00 28 9b 58 00 00 34 06 fd b9 Oa Oa Oa 09 c0 a8 .~:.K..4 
0020 19 03 a9 S5 00 50 51 61 30 le lc a 1 30 le 50 10  P~a0...0.P. 
0030 Oc 00 ? c 69 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 OO ..~i  
18506 502.9635? 1 10.10.10.? -> 192.168.22.4 TCP 4?6?? > 45295 [PSH, ACK] 
0000 00 90 4? 05 59 55 00 00 e8 12 6d 3a 08 00 45 00 ..G.Ye....m:..E. 
0010 00 38 10 14 40 00 3f 06 40 of Oa Oa Oa 07 c0 a8 .8..~.?.~ 
0020 16 04 ba 3d b0 of c2 d 1 c8 be 29 ?3 ?6 e 1 80 18 ..._ ~s~~... 
0030 23 2a ab 46 00 00 O1 O1 08 Oa O1 23 ed 35 04 00 #~'~.F #.5.. 
0040 9c 09 64 69 ?2 Oa ..dir. 
Figure A.1 Nested if statements 
The results of this test show that all if conditions in this statement were reached as 
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all of the resulting IP addresses were found in various packets. It should be noted that 
the functionality of this script cannot be determined by the distribution of the resulting 
source IPs. Connection tracking obviates the randomness of the checksum field as once 
a packet is part of a connection Apoc disallow any modification to the IP address. 
Testing Conditional Statements 
The following test was developed to analyze the conditional statements in Apoc. 
Apoc allows the user to string together conditional statements with and or or operators. 
This test contained three conditional statements grouped with the and operator and 
three conditional statements grouped together with the or operator. This results of this 
test were poor. 
~,p~c Script Resulting packets 
if~: ip.src =_ '192.158.21.3' && 
ip.dst =_ '192.168.25.1' && 
icmp.t~pe == 81{ 
eth.dst = '00:00:00:00:00:00'; 
eth.src = '00:00:00:00:00:00'; 
eth.proto = 0; 
1 
if~: ip.csum == 51225 ~~ 
ip.csum == 11013 ~~ 
ip.csum == 15'234:►{ 
eth.dst = 'l 1:11:11:11:11:11'; 
eth.src = '11:11:11:11:11:11'; 
eth.proto = 0::<1111; 
1 
12 0.0568? 3 OO.d6.af -~ a8.19.01 FC Link Ctl, ACKl 
0000 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 45 00  E. 
0010 00 lc e9 ff 00 00 2a O1 f? 8c c0 a8 15 03 c0 a8 
0020 19 O1 OS 00 d5 of 6a cb b5 84 00 00 00 00 00 00 
0030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
»: 
J
13 0.0?5140 85.00.50 -~ a8.19.01 FC Link Ctl, ~1CK1[~•talformed Packet] 
0000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 d5 00  E. 
0010 00 28 49 6f 00 40 2c 06 96 Oc c0 a8 15 03 c0 a8 .(lo.., 
0020 19 O 1 ~- I S5 00 50 cf e 1 2d 9e ae '? 1 2d 9e 50 10  P..-..!-.P. 
0030 Oc 00 ? 1 6a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..qj 
3054 9.d32259 11:11:11:11:11:11 -> 11:11:11:11:11:11 0:x1111 Ethernet II 
0000 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 t~  n'lj   
0010 OS 00 05 Od 00 O1 00 00 e8 12 6d 3a c0 a8 ld O1  m-
0020 00 00 00 00 00 00 c0 a8 ld 02 00 00 00 00 00 00  
0034 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
3055 9.435295 11:11:11:11:11:11 -> 11:11:11:11:11:11 0x1111 Ethernet II 
0000 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 ~Q~:'Dlj  
0010 08 00 06 04 00 02 00 90 4? 05 59 55 c0 a8 ld 02  G.Ye.... 
0020 00 00 e8 lc 5d 3a c0 a8 ld O1 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....m' 
0030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 
Figure A.2 Inaccurate conditional statements 
The first two packets are a result of a match from the first if statement. The first 
packet matched correctly. However, the second packet is an error. The byte highlighted 
in red should be 0x08 as is specified by the icmp.type line in the script, however, here 
it is 0x49. This signifies that an incorrect packet as passed through the conditional 
statement. 
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The third and forth packets are a result of a match from the second if statement. The 
red highlighting shows that these packets are not IP packets, but rather ARP packets. 
The script should only match IP packets, meaning this packets were incorrectly passed 
through the conditional statement. 
Testing Proper OfFsets 
The results in this section were obtained from tests focused on determining if each 
ofrset in the language accurately maps to the proper area in a packet. When perform-
ing these tests Apoc seemed to accurately perform the necessary modification in every 
scenario. Figure A.3 through A.8 show the results from various protocols. 
Apoc script R~sultin~ packets 
eth.dst = '00:00:00:00:00:00'; 
eth.src = '11:11:11:11:11:11'; 
eth.proto = 8?38; 
3 0.01''094 11:11:11:11:11:11 -> 00:00:00 00:00:00 0x2222 Ethernet II 
0000 00 00 00 00 00 00 11 11 11 11 11 11 22 22 45 08  
0010 00 S4 99 36 40 00 3f 06 of 2c c0 a8 16 02 c0 a8 .4.;~~.?.., 
0020 1? 01 90 cf 00 16 ?3 84 04 30 ee 6f 03 75 80 10  s..0.o.u.. 
0030 2e 00 65 f3 00 00 O1 O1 08 Oa 53 f0 64 Oe 53 eb ..e S.d.S. 
0040 29 Od ). 
4 0.014960 11:11:11:11:11:11 -> 00:00:00 00:00:00 0x2222 Ethernet II 
0000 00 00 00 00 00 00 11 11 11 11 11 11 22 22 45 08  
0010 00 54 99 3c 44 00 3f 06 of Ob c0 a8 16 02 c0 a8 .T.¢~~  7 
0020 17 O 1 90 cf 00 16 ?3 84 04 30 ee 6f 03 ?5 80 18  s..0.o.u.. 
0030 2e 00 b4 36 00 00 O1 O1 08 Oa 53 f0 64 Oe 53 eb ...6 S.d.S. 
0040 29 Od 3f 65 of 39 05 f9 9d 3d 6a 3a 61 c 1 04 8? ).?..9...=j:a... 
0050 24 cb c9 94 25 dff3 5e c0 ?6 lc 21 2a 98 a3 a4 $...%..".v.F•~... 
0060 9c ?9 .y 
5 0.019008 11:11:11:11:11:11 -> 00:00:00 00:00:00 0x2222 Ethernet II 
0000 00 00 00 00 00 00 11 11 11 11 11 11 22 22 45 08  ""E. 
0010 00 34 99 3d 40 00 3f 06 of 2a c0 a8 16 02 c0 a8 .4.=~.? ~* 
0020 1? O 1 90 cf 00 16 ? 3 84 04 50 ee 6f 03 75 80 11  s..P.o.u.. 
4030 2e 00 65 d2 04 00 O1 O1 08 4a 53 f0 54 Oe 53 eb ..e S.d.S. 
0040 29 Od ~. 
6 0.022593 11:11:11:11:11:11 -> 00:00:00 00:00:00 0x2222 Ethernet it 
0000 00 00 00 00 00 00 11 11 11 11 11 11 22 22 45 08  ""E. 
0010 00 34 de 35 40 00 40 06 a9 32 c0 a8 16 02 c0 a8 .4.5~.~..2 
0020 1? O 1 90 cf 00 16 ee 6f 03 ?5 73 84 04 51 80 11  o.us..Q.. 
0030 25 40 6d 91 00 00 O1 O1 08 Oa 53 eb 29 Od 53 f0 &gym S.).S. 
0040 54 Oe d. 
? 0.026??0 11:11:11:11:11:11 -> 00:00:00 00:04:00 0x2222 Ethernet II 
0000 00 00 00 00 00 00 11 11 11 11 11 11 22 22 45 08  ""E. 
0010 00 34 99 3e 40 00 3f 06 of 29 c0 a8 16 02 c0 a8 .4.>~.? ) 
0020 17 O 1 90 cf 00 16 ? 3 84 04 51 ee 6f 03 76 80 10  s..Q.o.v.. 
0030 2e 00 65 d 1 00 00 O 1 O1 08 Oa 53 f0 64 Oe 53 eb ..e S.d.S. 
0040 29 Od ~. 
Figure A.3 Modifying Ethernet fields 
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~p~c Script 
arp.h~nfmt = 0x1111; 
arp.protofmt =0x2222; 
arp.h~,vlen = 0::<33; 
arp.protolen = 0x44; 
arp.op = 0x5555; 
arp.srch~N = '55:55:65:56:55:56'; 
arp.srcaddr = '119.119.119.119'; 
arp.dsth~a = '88:88:88:88:88:88'; 
arp.dstaddr = '153.153.153.153'; 
~p~c Script 
ip.ihlver = O:x 11; 
ip.len = 0x3333; 
ip.id = 0x4444; 
ip.frags = 0x5555; 
ip.ttl = 0:56; 
ip.proto = 0x37; 
ip.csum = 0x8888; 
ip.src = '153.153.153.153'; 
ip.dst = '136.135.135.136'; 
Resulting pickets 
8 0.1500?0 >'icctonTe_12:6d:3a -~ GigaFast_05:59:65 iiP.P [t•lalformed Packet] 
0000 00 90 4? 05 59 55 00 00 e8 12 6d 3a 03 06 11 11 ..G.Ye....m~ 
OU 10 22 22 33 44 55 55 66 66 66 66 66 66 77 77 73 77 "" 3DUUfffff~nnn•n~ 
0020 88 88 88 88 88 88 99 99 99 99 00 00 00 00 00 00  
0030 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 
9 0.154030 GigaFast_05:59:65 -> ►~cctonTe_12:6d:3a ARP [t•lalformed Packet] 
0000 00 00 e8 12 5d 3a 00 90 47 
0010 22 22 33 44 55 55 66 66 66 
0020 88 88 88 88 88 88 99 99 99 
0030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
05 59 55 08 05 11 11 ....m:..G.Ye.... 
66 66 66 77 77 77 77 "" 3DUUffl~nn<nn~ 
99 00 00 00 00 00 00  
00 00 00 
602 9.0? 1594 AcctonTe_12:6d:3a -y GigaFast_05:59:65 AP.P [~•lalformed Packet] 
0000 00 90 47 05 59 65 00 00 e8 12 5d 3a 08 05 11 11 ..G.Ye....m~ 
0010 22 22 33 44 55 55 66 66 66 66 66 66 77 77 77 77 "" 3DUUffl~nrn•n•n 
0020 88 88 88 88 88 88 99 99 99 99 00 00 00 00 00 00  
0030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
Figure A.4 Modifying Arp fields 
Resulting pickets 
3 +).023155 x5cctonTe_12:6d:3a -> GigaFast_05:59:55 IP Bogus IP Header length +:4, must be at least 20 
0000 00 90 4? 05 59 55 00 00 e8 12 5d 3a 08 00 11 22 ..G.Ye....m:..." 
0010 33 33 44 44 55 55 66 77 88 88 99 99 99 99 88 88 33DDUUfin~ 
0020 88 88 90 cf 00 16 73 84 Od 30 ee 6f 03 75 80 10  s..0.o.u.. 
0030 2e 00 55 f3 00 00 O1 01 08 Oa 53 f0 64 Oe 53 eb ..e S.d.S. 
0040 29 Od ). 
~ 0.029195 ~icctonTe_12:6d:3a -> GigaFast_05:59:65 IP Bogus IP Deader length 4'4, must be at least 201 
0000 00 90 47 OS 59 55 00 00 e8 12 6d 3a 08 00 11 22 ..G.Ye....m:..." 
0010 33 33 44 44 55 55 66 77 88 88 99 99 99 99 88 88 33DDUUfiry 
0020 88 88 90 cf 00 16 ?3 84 Od 30 ee 6f 03 75 80 18  s..0.o.u.. 
0030 2e 40 b4 35 00 00 01 01 08 Oa 53 f0 54 Oe 53 eb ...6 S.d.S. 
0040 29 Od :3f 65 of 39 05 f9 9d 3d 5a 3a 51 cl 04 87 1.?..9...=j:a... 
0050 24 cb c9 94 25 dff3 5e c0 76 lc 21 2a 98 a3 a4 $...°.'o..".v.F*... 
0060 9c ? 9 .y 
5 0.0353?9 ~cctonTe_12:6d:3a -~ GigaFast_05:59:55 IP Bogus IP header length +:4, must be at least 20:+ 
DDDD 00 90 4? 05 59 65 00 00 e8 12 6d 3a 08 00 11 22 ..G.Ye....m:..." 
DD 10 33 33 44 44 55 55 66 77 88 88 99 99 99 99 88 88 33DDUUf~ 
0020 88 88 90 cf OD 15 73 84 04 50 ee 5f 03 75 80 11  s..P.o.u.. 
0030 2e DO 55 d2 00 OD O1 O 1 08 Oa 53 f0 64 Oe 53 eb ..e S.d.S. 
0040 29 Dd 1. 
5 0.051190 GigaFast_05:59:55 -> AcctonTe_12:5d:3a IP Bogus IP header length (4, must be at least 201 
0000 00 00 e8 12 5d 3a 00 90 47 05 59 65 08 00 11 22 ....m:..G.Ye..." 
0010 33 33 44 44 55 55 66 77 88 88 99 99 99 99 88 88 33DDUUfn~ 
0020 88 88 00 16 90 cf ee 6f 03 75 73 84 04 51 80 11  o.us..Q.. 
0030 25 40 5d 91 00 00 O1 O1 08 Oa 53 eb 29 Od 53 f0 &gym S.1.S. 
0040 54 Oe d. 
? 0.062074 AcctonTe_12:6d:3a -y GigaFast_05:59:65 IP Bogus IP header length ~4, must be at least 201 
0000 00 90 4? 05 59 55 00 00 e8 12 5d 3a 08 00 11 22 ..G.Ye....m:..." 
0010 33 33 44 44 55 55 66 77 88 88 99 99 99 99 88 88 33DDUUfiM 
0020 88 88 90 cf 00 16 73 84 04 51 ee 6f 03 76 80 10  s..i~.o.v.. 
0030 2e 00 65 dl 00 00 O1 O1 08 Oa 53 f0 64 Oe 53 eb ..e S.d.S. 
0040 29 Od 1. 
Figure A.5 Modifying IP fields 
52 
Ap~c ~cri pt 
icmp.type = 0x00; 
icmp.code = 0x11; 
icmp.csum = 0x2222; 
icmp.id = 0x3333; 
icmp.seq = 0x4444; 
Apoc Script 
tcp.src = 0:x:0000; 
tcp.dst = 0x1111; 
tcp.ack = 0x33333333; 
tcp.offset = 0:x44; 
tcp.flags =0x55; 
tcp.~Nin = 0x6665; 
tcp.csum — Ox77~~; 
tcp.urg = 0:x8888; 
F~esu Iti n~ packets 
1 0.000000 192.168.21.3 -> 192.168.25.0 ICF1P Echo ipingl reply 
0400 00 00 e8 12 6d 3a 00 90 4? 05 59 65 48 00 45 00 ....m:..G.Ye..E. 
0010 00 lc 88 59 00 00 35 O1 4e 34 c0 a8 15 03 c0 a8 ...Y..5.tJ4 
00''0 19 00 00 11 22 22 33 33 44 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....""33DD 
0030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
2 0.016? 95 192.168.21.3 -> 192.168.25.1 ICh1P Echo (ping? reply 
0000 00 00 e8 12 5d 3a 00 90 47 05 59 55 O8 00 45 00 ....m:..G.Ye..E. 
0010 00 lc e9 ff 00 00 2a O1 f7 8c c0 a8 15 03 c0 a8  ~•~ 
0020 19 01 00 11 22 22 33 33 44 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....""33DD 
0030 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
3 0.030941 192.158.21.3 -> 192.168.25.2 ICh1P Echo 1ping:~ reply 
0000 00 00 e8 12 6d 3a 00 90 4? OS 59 65 08 00 45 00 ....m:..G.Ye..E. 
0010 00 lc d9 a6 00 00 34 O1 fd e4 c0 a8 15 03 c0 a8  4 
0020 19 02 00 11 22 22 33 33 44 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....""33DD 
0030 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 
4 0.045032 192.168.21.3 -> 192.168.25.3 ICF1P Echo ~:ping:~ reply 
0000 00 00 e8 12 5d 3a 00 90 4? 05 59 65 08 00 45 00 ....m:..G.Ye..E. 
0010 00 lc 24 f5 00 00 2e O1 68 95 c0 a3 15 03 c0 a8 ..$ 
0020 19 03 00 11 22 22 33 33 44 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....""33DD 
0030 04 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 
Figure A.6 Modifying ICMP fields 
Ftesu Iti n~ packets 
3 0.020199 192.168.27.2 -> 192.168.23.1 TCP 0 > 4369 [Flt•J, P.ST, ,~CK, EChJ] 
0000 00 90 47 05 59 65 00 00 e8 12 6d 3a 08 00 45 08 ..G.Ye....m:..E. 
0010 00 34 99 3b 40 00 3f 06 of 2c c0 a8 lb 02 c0 a8 .4.;@~.? 
0020 17 01 00 00 11 11 22 22 22 22 33 33 33 33 44 55  """"3333DU 
0030 66 66 7F 77 88 88 O1 O1 08 Oa 53 f0 54 Oe 53 eb fin•~v S.d.S. 
0040 29 Od :►. 
4 0.024356 192.168.27.2 -> 192.158.23.1 TCP 0 > 4369 [FIN, RST, ACID., ECPJ] 
0000 00 90 4? 05 59 65 00 00 e8 12 6d 3a 08 00 45 08 ..G.Ye....m: E. 
0010 00 54 99 3c 40 00 3f 06 of Ob c0 a8 16 02 c0 a8 .T.~Crn.? 
0020 17 O 1 00 44 11 11 22 22 22 22 33 33 33 33 44 55  """"3333DU 
0030 66 66 77 77 88 88 O1 O1 08 Oa 53 f0 64 Oe 53 eb f~nnr S.d.S. 
0040 29 Od 3f b5 of 39 05 f9 9d 3d 6a 3a 61 cl Od 87 1.?..9...=j:a... 
0050 24 cb c9 94 25 dff3 5e c4 76 lc 21 2a 98 a3 a4 $...%..".w.!~•~... 
0050 9c 79 .y 
5 0.030863 192.165.27.2 -> 192.168.23.1 TCP 0 > 4369 [FIN, RST, ACS, ECN] 
0000 00 90 4? 45 59 65 00 00 e8 12 6d 3a 08 00 45 08 ..G.Ye....m:..E. 
0010 00 34 99 3d 40 00 3f 06 of 2a c0 a8 16 02 c0 a8 .4.=~.?..~•~ 
0020 17 O1 00 00 11 11 22 22 22 22 33 33 33 33 44 55  """"3333DU 
0030 66 66 77 77 88 88 O1 O1 08 Oa 53 f0 64 Oe 53 eb fl~N S.d.S. 
0040 29 Od ~. 
6 0.035961 192.168.23.1 -> 192.168.27.2 TCP 0 > 4369 [Flt•1, P.ST, dCk:, ECt•1] 
0000 00 00 e8 12 6d 3a 00 90 47 05 59 65 08 00 45 08 ....m:..G.Ye..E. 
0010 00 34 de 35 40 00 40 06 a9 32 c0 a8 17 O1 c0 a8 .4.5~.~..2...... 
0020 16 02 DO QO 11 11 22 22 22 22 33 33 33 33 44 55  """"3333DU 
0030 66 66 77 77 88 88 O1 O1 08 Oa 53 eb 29 Od 53 f0 ~N S.:►.S. 
0040 64 Oe d. 
7 0.039296 192.168.27.2 -> 192.168.23.1 TCP 0 ~- 4369 [FIN, P.ST, ACk:, ECt•J] 
0000 00 90 47 05 59 65 00 00 e8 12 5d 3a 08 00 45 08 ..G.Ye....n~:..E. 
0010 00 34 99 3e 40 00 3f 06 of 29 c0 a8 16 02 c0 a8 .4.>~~.?..) 
0020 17 O 1 00 00 11 11 22 22 22 22 33 33 33 33 44 55  """"3333DU 
0030 66 66 77 77 88 88 O1 O1 08 Oa 53 f0 64 Oe 53 eb fRnry S.d_S. 
0040 29 Od ). 
Figure A.7 Modifying TCP fields 
~,p~~ Seri pt 
udp.src = 0:x0000; 
udp.dst = 0x1111; 
udp.len = Ox=2~~~; 
udp.csum = 0x3333; 
Resulting packets 
1 0.000000 192.168.23.4 -> 129.186.140.200 UDP Source port: 0 Destination port: 4369 
0000 00 00 e8 12 6d 3a 00 90 4? 05 59 65 08 00 45 00 ....m:..G.Ye..E. 
0010 00 3d 05 45 00 00 ?f 11 50 3c c0 a8 1? 04 81 ba .=.E....Pa 
0020 8c c8 00 00 11 11 22 22 33 33 00 10 O 1 00 00 O 1  "" 33 
0030 00 00 00 00 40 40 06 ? 3 69 6? 5e 69 6e 44 65 62  signin.eb 
0040 61 79 03 63 5f 6d 00 00 O1 00 O1 ay.com 
2 14.901403 192.168.29.2 -> 129.186.14'2.200 UDP Source port: 0 Destination port: 4369 
0000 00 00 e8 12 6d 3a 00 90 4? 05 59 65 08 00 45 10 ....m:..G.Ye..E. 
0010 00 4c 00 00 40 00 40 11 4c 64 c0 a8 ld 02 81 ba .L..~.~a.Ld 
0020 8e c8 00 00 11 11 22 22 33 33 23 03 Qa of 00 00  ""33# 
0030 11 ce 00 00 13 93 81 ba 8e c8 c5 '2 8 2f 95 ?d 42  f!.}B 
0040 d4 90 c5 28 2f 95 ?c f5 16 ? ~ c5 28 2f 95 ?d 42 ...~:l.~..r.fl.}B 
0050 d4 90 c5 28 33 95 ?f ea 2d 2f ...i3...-! 
3 14.905606 1'29.186.142.200 -> 192.168.29.2 UDP Source port: 0 Destination port: 4359 
0000 00 90 4? 05 59 65 00 00 e8 12 6d 3a 08 00 45 10 ..G.Ye....m:..E. 
0010 00 4c 29 09 00 00 3c 11 6? 56 31 ba 8e c8 c0 a8 .L:i...~.g[ 
0020 ld 02 00 00 11 11 22 22 33 33 24 02 oa ec 00 00  ""33$ 
0030 11 ?e 00 00 4f 8d 80 09 b0 le c5 28 2c 53 8? 12  l',5.. 
0040 a0 ec c5 28 33 95 ?f ea 2d 2f c5 28 33 95 7f eb ...~:3...,(.~:3... 
0050 ? c bb c5 28 33 95 ?fed d8 66 ~..{3  
d 19.329230 192.168.23.4 -> 192.163.184.1 UDP Source poet: 0 Destination port: 4369 
4000 00 00 e8 12 5d 3a 00 90 4? 05 59 65 03 00 45 00 ....m:..G Ye..E. 
0010 01 ?f 06 8c 00 00 ?f 11 e3 86 c0 a8 1? 04 c0 a8  
0020 b8 O1 00 00 11 11 22 22 33 33 84 el 84 00 00 00  ""33 
0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 43 4b 41 41 41 41 41 41 41   C iCAAlIAA~'1.Q 
0040 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 dl 41 n.1h~1~5h,1~'S15,1P~~~n~5~~h 
0050 41 41 41 41 dl 41 41 00 00 21 00 O1 00 00 00 00 hr~hlU'Jvi ~ 
0050 00 f5 Ob 49 de 5d 45 4? 52 dl 32 33 3d 20 20 20 ...IPJTEGP.A23d 
40?0 20 20 00 44 00 49 4e 54 45 4? 52 41 32 33 34 20 .D.It•1TEGi~,234 
0080 20 20 20 20 20 d4 00 49 4e 54 45 4? 52 41 32 33 D.INTEGP.A23 
0090 30 2020 20 20 20 00 c4 00 49 4e 54 45 43 52 41 0 ...IWTEGP.~1 
OOa0 32 33 30 20 20 20 20 20 le c4 00 49 4e 65 ? 4 ?e 230 ...Inlet--
00b0 53 55 ?2 ?6 59 63 65 ?3 20 20 lc c4 00 49 53 7e Services ...IS~ 
40c0 49 4e 54 45 4? 52 41 32 33 34 00 00 00 44 00 49 INTEGP,A234...D.1 
OOd0 4e 54 45 4? 52 41 32 33 30 20 20 20 24 20 ld 4d hJTEGR.y234 .D 
OOe0 00 49 4e 54 45 4? 52 dl 32 33 34 20 20 20 20 20 .II'•JTEGP.u234 
OOf0 03 44 00 01 02 5f 5f 4d 53 42 52 4f 5? 53 45 5f .D... ~•1SBP.OWSE 
0100 5f 02 O1 c4 00 5f 5f 55 4d 5? 41 52 45 5f 55 53 _ ~lF1WAP.E US 
0110 45 52 5f 5f 03 44 00 52 4f 4f 54 '20 20 20 20 20 ER_.D.P.40T 
0120 20 20 20 20 20 20 03 44 00 00 Od 56 03 ab 96 00 .D...V.... 
0130 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
0140 00 00 00 00 00 00 Oo 00 00 40 00 04 00 04 00 00  
0150 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
0160 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 56 db s5 00 00 00 00 00 oa  ~~~ 
01?0 00 00 oQ o0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
0180 00 00 80 e8 b9 85 60 5c f0 bf 00 00 40  `1 
Figure A.8 Modifying UDP fields 
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